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I.  INTRODUCTION 
If all goes as expected this year, the history of Rule 56 will have a 
curious three-year period in which summary-judgment practice was 
governed by ―should‖ instead of ―shall.‖  As originally adopted in 1938, 
Rule 56 stated that summary judgment ―shall be rendered forthwith [if 
the materials in the summary judgment record] show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
 
* Welcome D. & W. DeVier Pierson Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law.  This 
paper was the basis for my remarks at the Association of American Law Schools (AALS) Section 
on Litigation program on ―The Future of Summary Judgment,‖ held during the AALS Annual 
Meeting in New Orleans in January 2010.  Since 2005, I have served as a member of the Advisory 
Committee on Civil Rules.  During this time, the Advisory Committee completed its work on the 
Restyling Project and conducted all work on the Rule 56 Project.  While I have drawn on my 
rulemaking experiences in preparing this paper, the views expressed herein are mine and should not 
be attributed to the Advisory Committee or any of its other members.  I want to thank Ed Cooper, 
Joe Kimble, and Jeff Stempel for their comments on an earlier draft and hereby absolve them of any 
responsibility for any errors or heresies that might remain.  I also thank the University of Oklahoma 
College of Law and Mr. DeVier Pierson for their continuing research support. 
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judgment as a matter of law.‖1  That‘s how it read for nearly 70 years.  
In December 2007, however, Rule 56 was restyled to say that summary 
judgment ―should be rendered‖ when the above-stated conditions are 
met.
2
  The most recent proposed amendments to Rule 56, scheduled to 
take effect on December 1, 2010, will return Rule 56 from ―should‖ to 
―shall.‖3 
The 2007 transition from ―shall‖ to ―should‖ was part of the Style 
Project, in which the Advisory Committee rewrote the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure using clearer and more modern language.
4
  The style 
conventions governing the project did not allow the use of ―shall‖ in the 
restyled rules.
5
  Thus, the Advisory Committee had to find some other 
word to use.  It settled on ―should.‖  The choice of ―should‖ reflected the 
Advisory Committee‘s view that Rule 56 conferred on trial judges a 
limited discretion to deny summary judgment even when the moving 
party had met the requirements set forth in the rule.
6
 
Even before the restyled ―should‖ version of Rule 56 took effect, 
however, the Advisory Committee began a study of the content and 
substance (not just the style) of Rule 56.
7
  As a result of that study, the 
Advisory Committee published proposed amendments to Rule 56 in 
August 2008.
8
  The published version continued to use ―should.‖  
 
 1. See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE‘S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 56 app. 1 (3d ed. 
2009) (appendix providing historical rule text) (emphasis added). 
 2. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 & advisory committee‘s note (2007). 
 3. See Order Adopting Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Apr. 
28, 2010), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv10.pdf. 
 4. See infra notes 17-23 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. 
 6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee‘s note (2007). 
 7. See infra notes 62-91 and accompanying text. 
 8. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS 
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPELLATE, BANKRUPTCY, CIVIL, AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, AND THE 
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE (Aug. 2008).  In this article, further citations to the August 2008 proposed 
amendments to the Civil Rules will be to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee‘s Report to the 
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure dated May 9, 2008, as supplemented June 30, 2008.  See 
REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, May 9, 2008, as supplemented June 30, 2008, at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV_Report.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL RULES REPORT AS 
SUPPLEMENTED JUNE 2008].  I do so for ease of access.  The supplemented report dated June 30, 2008 is 
available on-line, whereas the full published pamphlet is not.  With respect to the proposed amendments 
to the Civil Rules, the content is identical.  The Advisory Committee submitted its proposals to the 
Standing Committee seeking permission to publish in the version of the report dated May 9, 2008.  After 
the Standing Committee gave permission, the Advisory Committee submitted a supplemented report, 
dated June 30, 2008, revised to reflect changes to the proposal materials made in response to comments 
or directions from the Standing Committee.  Most importantly for purposes of this article, the 
supplemented report includes the specific invitations for comment as formulated during the process of 
seeking approval to publish.  The full published pamphlet of proposed amendments simply reproduces 
2
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However, the Advisory Committee specifically invited comments on 
whether ―should‖ was the right term.9  The Advisory Committee took 
this step because it was aware that some people – including several 
members of the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 
– believed that ―should‖ had been a mistranslation of ―shall.‖10  Taking 
the position that Rule 56 creates an entitlement to summary judgment 
when the criteria set forth in the rule are met, the critics of the restyled 
―should‖ version of Rule 56 argued that the correct translation of ―shall‖ 
was ―must.‖11 
During the comment period, the proponents of ―must‖ seized the 
opportunity to urge the Advisory Committee to fix the alleged 
mistranslation of ―shall.‖12  Their efforts to get ―must‖ into the rule text 
failed.  But the Advisory Committee was persuaded that the switch to 
―should‖ had been improvident.  In order to avoid the risk that ―should‖ 
might skew the question of discretion to deny, the Advisory Committee 
decided to restore ―shall.‖13 
This Essay has three parts.  Parts I and II look backward.  Part I 
tells the story of the switch from ―shall‖ to ―should‖ in 2007.  Part II 
then explains the events that led the Advisory Committee to propose the 
amendment that, if it takes effect as scheduled on December 1, 2010, 
will restore ―shall‖ to the text of Rule 56. 
I present these events in considerably more detail than one 
normally gets about rule changes involving the alteration of a single 
word.  I do so for two reasons.  First, Rule 56 is not just any rule; it is 
one of the cornerstones of the pretrial system created in 1938.
14
  And 
―shall‖ is not just any word in that rule; it is a critical term defining the 
court‘s authority.  Thus, the high level of detail is commensurate with 
the stakes involved.  Second, because of the importance of summary 
 
the supplemented report (packaging it with the parallel reports from the other Advisory Committees).  
Thus, the most accessible source of the full proposal is the on-line version of the supplemented report 
dated June 30, 2008. 
 9. See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text. 
 10. See STANDING COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MINUTES, 
MEETING OF JUNE 9-10, 2008, at 24-29, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Minutes/ST06-2008-min.pdf [hereinafter STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES OF JUNE 2008]. 
 11. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.  See generally Bradley Scott Shannon, Should 
Summary Judgment Be Granted?, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 85 (2008). 
 12. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text. 
 14. See EDWARD J. BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT:  FEDERAL LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 1:1 (3d ed. 2006); MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, at ¶ 56.02 (―Rule 56, which 
provides for and regulates summary judgment, is one of the most important of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.‖). 
3
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judgment, and because ―shall‖ and ―should‖ are key words in terms of 
the meaning of Rule 56, it would be tempting to conclude that the 
Advisory Committee must have had significant changes in mind.  In 
fact, quite the opposite is true.  Both times, the Advisory Committee‘s 
objective was to make no change whatsoever to the court‘s authority to 
grant or deny summary judgment.
15
  The stories behind the round-trip 
journey from ―shall‖ to ―should‖ and back explain how and why so 
much rulemaking activity occurred given that the goal all along has been 
to leave this aspect of summary-judgment practice undisturbed. 
Part III looks forward.  It addresses a single, critical question:  how 
much discretion to deny summary judgment will trial judges have once 
―shall‖ is restored?  The answer is this: with the restoration of ―shall,‖ 
trial courts will return to whatever measure of discretion they had on 
November 30, 2007 – no more, no less.16 
II.  FROM ―SHALL‖ TO ―SHOULD‖ 
For almost 70 years, Rule 56 provided that summary judgment 
―shall be rendered‖ upon a showing that no genuine dispute of material 
fact existed and the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  That familiar phrase was changed on December 1, 2007, when 
Rule 56 was amended to provide that summary judgment ―should be 
rendered‖ upon that showing.  This Part explains the reasons behind that 
change. 
A. Rule 56 and the Style Project 
The switch from ―shall‖ to ―should‖ took place as part of the Style 
Project.  Most readers likely are familiar with the Style Project, so I will 
not engage in a detailed history of it here.
17
  Nor do I think it necessary 
to rehearse the debate about whether the Style Project was a wise 
 
 15. See infra notes 114-23 and accompanying text. 
 16. By answering the question this way I do not mean to be coy.  An upcoming companion 
article will address both the historical question of whether Rule 56 conferred discretion to deny 
from 1938 to 2007 and the policy arguments that might support such discretion.  See Steven S. 
Gensler, Discretion to Deny Summary Judgment (forthcoming 2011) (draft on file with author). 
 17. The most comprehensive discussion of the Style Project was written by Professor Ed 
Cooper, the Reporter to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.  See Edward H. Cooper, Restyling the 
Civil Rules:  Clarity Without Change, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1761 (2004).  For additional 
treatment, see Jeremy Counseller, Rooting for the Restyled Rules (Even Though I Opposed Them), 
78 MISS. L.J. 519, 524-41 (2009) (discussing the history leading up to the Style Project and the 
restyling process as it played out), and Lisa Eichhorn, Clarity and the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure:  A Lesson from the Style Project, 5 J. ASS‘N. OF LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 1, 3-5 
(Fall 2008). 
4
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undertaking.
18
  For purposes of this essay, it is sufficient to note two 
things. 
First, the Style Project entailed a stem-to-stern rewriting of the 
Civil Rules that took the existing meaning of each Rule and attempted to 
express that meaning more clearly and in modern language.
19
  Second, 
the most fundamental guiding principle of the Style Project was that it 
truly be limited to style; the restyling could not alter the meaning of the 
Rules.
20
  The Advisory Committee took extraordinary steps to honor that 
limitation.  In the pre-publication phase alone, the restyling process 
included five separate steps in which different sets of eyes reviewed the 
proposed changes for possible substantive effects.
21
  Whenever the 
Advisory Committee concluded that a proposed style change posed a 
serious risk of changing meaning, the Advisory Committee either 
rejected the change or, in a small number of situations, proceeded with 
the change as part of a separate Style-Substance track.
22
 
Rule 56 proved to be one of the most difficult rules to restyle.  
Although lawyers generally are well-versed in the day-in-and-day-out 
workings of summary-judgment practice, the text of Rule 56 is silent on 
many of those matters.  Worse yet, some provisions are routinely 
ignored or neglected by judges and lawyers alike because they are 
 
 18. See, e.g., Edward A. Hartnett, Against (Mere) Restyling, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155 
(2006);  Jeremy Counseller & Rory Ryan, The Restyling of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  A 
Solution in Search of a Problem, WASH. U. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS (Nov. 7, 2007), 
http://lawreview.wustl.edu/slip-opinions/the-restyling-of-the-federal-rules-of-civil-procedure-a-
solution-in-search-of-a-problem/; Jeffrey S. Parker, Postponing the 2007 “Restyling” Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:  A Letter to Members of the Judiciary Committees of the 
House and Senate,  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1016221.  One critic 
characterized the restyling project as ―an example of the kind of minor rules alteration that does not 
seek to improve adjudication.‖  Glenn S. Koppel, Reflections on the “Chimera” of a Uniform Code 
of State Civil Procedure:  The Virtue of Vision in Procedural Reform, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 971, 980 
n.63 (2009). 
 19. See Cooper, supra note 17; Joseph Kimble, Lessons in Drafting from the New Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 THE SCRIBES J. OF LEGAL WRITING 25 (2008-09) (providing examples 
of the types of changes that were made during the restyling of the Civil Rules). 
 20. See Cooper, supra note 17, at 1780; Introduction to Preliminary Draft of Proposed Style 
Revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, at vii-ix (Feb. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Prelim_draft_. 
proposed_pt1.pdf [hereinafter Introduction to Preliminary Draft of Restyled Civil Rules]. 
 21. See Memorandum from Joseph Kimble Accompanying Preliminary Draft of Proposed 
Style Amendments, at x-xi (Feb. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Prelim_draft_proposed_ 
pt1.pdf [hereinafter Kimble Memorandum].  Professor Kimble‘s memorandum, titled ―Guiding 
Principles for Restyling the Civil Rules,‖ has been reprinted in 84 MICH. B.J. 56 (Sept. 2005); 84 
MICH. B.J. 52 (Oct. 2005). 
 22. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, June 2, 2006 (Revised July 
2006), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV06-2006.pdf, at 19, 
430-36. 
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simply outdated and out-of-step with modern summary-judgment 
practice.  As discussed in detail below, the disconnect between the text 
of Rule 56 and accepted summary-judgment practice that the Style 
Project exposed is what inspired the Advisory Committee to later 
consider and develop substantive amendments to Rule 56.
23
 
Perhaps the thorniest issue presented during the restyling of Rule 
56 was how to translate the word ―shall‖ as it appeared in the phrase 
―shall be granted.‖  Under the governing style conventions, the Advisory 
Committee was not allowed to use ―shall‖; it was a disfavored word to 
be excised from the rules wherever found.  Thus, some other word or 
phrase would have to be used.  And because of the Style Project 
imperative to not alter substantive meaning, the replacement word or 
phrase would have to convey the same meaning as had ―shall.‖  That 
would prove to be a very difficult task.  Before looking at how the 
Advisory Committee resolved the problem, however, it is worth 
exploring the history behind the directive to rid the rules of ―shall.‖ 
B. The Banishment of “Shall” 
In 1991, the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure created a Style Subcommittee to review the drafting style of 
all amendments to all of the Federal Rules.
24
  Soon thereafter, the Style 
Committee enlisted the assistance of Bryan Garner, a noted expert on 
legal writing, to be its style consultant.
25
  During the course of its work, 
the Style Committee developed numerous style conventions.  The Style 
Committee eventually asked Garner to compile those conventions into a 
manual.
26
  The Standing Committee published the manual, titled 
Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules, so that the public 
would better understand and appreciate the drafting and editing choices 
that were being made in the rulemaking process.  The Style Committee 
continues to adhere to those guidelines.
27
 
The banishment of ―shall‖ from the Civil Rules reflects Garner‘s 
view that rule-drafters needed to establish and follow a consistent 
 
 23. See infra notes 62-73. 
 24. Robert E. Keeton, Preface to BRYAN A. GARNER, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING AND 
EDITING COURT RULES, at iii, (1996).  For a more complete history of the effort to standardize the 
style of the various Federal Rules and how that effort evolved, see Counseller, supra note 17, at 
524-30. 
 25. Keeton, supra note 24, at iii. 
 26. George C. Pratt, Introduction to BRYAN A. GARNER, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING AND 
EDITING COURT RULES, at vi (1996). 
 27. See Kimble, supra note 19, at 79. 
6
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scheme for expressing what he termed ―words of authority.‖  As Garner 
would write in the Second Edition of his Dictionary of Modern Legal 
Usage, ―Few reforms would improve legal drafting more than if drafters 
were to begin paying closer attention to the verbs by which they set forth 
duties, rights, prohibitions, and entitlements.  In the current state of 
common-law drafting, these verbs are a horrific muddle . . . .‖28 
According to Garner, the chief culprit was the word ―shall.‖  Garner 
characterized ―shall‖ as both promiscuous and slippery.  He called 
―shall‖ promiscuous because it was being used in so many different 
ways.
29
  He called ―shall‖ slippery because its usage often would slip 
from one meaning to another, sometimes in the same rule, without any 
apparent recognition on the part of the drafter that the meaning had 
changed.
30
 
One way of solving both the ―slipperiness‖ and the ―promiscuity‖ 
problems would have been to give ―shall‖ a single meaning and then 
strictly confine the usage of ―shall‖ to that single meaning.  But Garner 
did not think that would be an effective solution.  He believed that 
―shall‖ had been so corrupted—and that the old usage habits would be so 
hard to break—that the only effective solution was to stop using ―shall‖ 
altogether.  In other words, when it came to ―shall,‖ he preached 
abstinence.
31
 
It should come as no surprise then that the Drafting Guidelines that 
Garner developed for the rulemaking process generally adopted and 
urged the abstinence method.  The Drafting Guidelines first supply a 
glossary setting forth the proper word to use for a particular expression 
of authority.
32
  When the drafters‘ intent is to say that something is 
required, the Drafting Guidelines say to use ―must.‖33  When the 
drafters‘ intent is to say that something is allowed, or that a court has 
discretion to do something, the Drafting Guidelines say to use ―may.‖34  
The glossary itself does not list ―shall.‖  Rather, the Drafting Guidelines 
say to replace ―shall‖ with ―must,‖ ―may,‖ or some other, more 
 
 28. BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 939 (2d. ed. 1995). 
 29. Id. at 939-40. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 940-41.  For an extended discussion on the history of the usage of ―shall,‖ see 
Joseph Kimble, The Many Misuses of Shall, 3 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 61 (1992). 
 32. See BRYAN A. GARNER, GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING AND EDITING COURT RULES § 4.2.A 
(1996). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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appropriate term.
35
  Notably, one of those other words of authority that 
appears in the glossary of terms is ―should,‖ which is listed for use to 
denote a ―directory provision.‖36 
So, when the Advisory Committee embarked upon the restyling of 
the Civil Rules, it was not working from scratch.
37
  The Drafting 
Guidelines were already in place and had been used successfully in the 
projects to restyle the Appellate Rules and the Criminal Rules.  The 
Garner-inspired campaign to rid the rules of ―shall‖ was, by then, well-
established.  The following passage from the minutes of the October 
2002 Advisory Committee meeting, which marked the start of the Style 
Project for the Civil Rules, sums up the situation well: ―The Civil Rules 
project will benefit from the experience of the other rules committees.  
Some of the battles have been fought; the winners and losers are 
identified.  ‗Must‘ has replaced ‗shall‘ as a term of mandatory duty.‖38 
If a final nail was needed to seal ―must‘s‖ coffin, it came in the 
form of Professor Joseph Kimble, a legal writing expert who had taken 
over as the Style Consultant.
39
  Professor Kimble was an equally staunch 
believer in the inherent ambiguity of ―must‖ and of the resulting need to 
excise it from the rules.
40
 
 
 35. Id. § 4.2.B.  The Drafting Guidelines do not completely foreclose the usage of ―shall.‖  
Rather, they provide an alternative that allows the use of ―shall‖ so long as the drafters are diligent 
in only using it to mean ―has a duty to.‖  Id. § 4.2.C.  This is consistent with Garner‘s view that, 
while abstinence is the best method, other solutions to the problem of inconsistent usage did exist. 
 36. Id. § 4.2.A. 
 37. This is true in a second respect as well.  The Advisory Committee began work on the 
Style Project as we know it in 2002.  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, Oct. 
3-4, 2002, at 6, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CRAC1002.pdf 
[hereinafter CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF OCT. 2002].  That work, however, built on prior efforts.  
The first effort to restyle the Civil Rules was undertaken by Bryan Garner when he was serving as 
the Style Consultant to the Standing Committee.  See Introduction to Preliminary Draft of Restyled 
Civil Rules, supra note 20, at vii.  The Garner draft then was revised by Judge Sam Pointer when he 
was the Chair of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee.  See CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF OCT. 
2002, supra, at 6, 11.  An initial effort to restyle all of the Civil Rules in one marathon session – 
now referred to as the ―fabled‖ or ―notorious‖ ―Sea Island Meeting‖ – quickly bogged down, 
demonstrating just how difficult and time-consuming a project to restyle the Civil Rules would be.  
See id. at 6.  The Garner-Pointer draft of the Civil Rules was then set aside while the Appellate 
Rules and the Criminal Rules were restyled.  See Introduction to Preliminary Draft of Restyled Civil 
Rules, supra note 20, at viii.  When the Advisory Committee picked the project back up, it used the 
Garner-Pointer draft as a starting point.  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, 
Oct. 2-3, 2003, at p. 3, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/ 
rules/Minutes/CRAC1003.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF OCT. 2003]. 
 38. See CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF OCT. 2002, supra note 37, at 7. 
 39. See Introduction to Preliminary Draft of Restyled Civil Rules, supra note 20, at viii. 
 40. See Kimble, supra note 31, at 75-76 (―So forget the archaic shall, use must instead . . . .‖). 
8
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Once the Advisory Committee started the process of restyling the 
Civil Rules, it quickly began to confront the problem of translating all of 
the different usages of ―shall‖ in the rules.  One particularly telling 
vignette is when the Advisory Committee had occasion to consider how 
to translate the various uses of ―shall‖ in Rule 16.41  The discussion was 
equally illuminating and daunting.  It convincingly demonstrated to the 
committee members both how difficult the translation of ―shall‖ was 
going to be at times—and how tempting it might be to duck those hard 
choices by sticking with ―shall‖ when the translation was difficult.42 
In the end, though, the Advisory Committee followed the lead set 
by the earlier restyling of the Appellate Rules and the Criminal Rules 
and decided that it would, to use Garner‘s term, practice abstinence and 
find a way to either replace or eliminate all of the ―shalls.‖43  In total, the 
Civil Rules had contained almost 500 ―shalls.‖44  Of the 500, 375 were 
translated to ―must.‖45  The remaining ―shalls‖ were eliminated through 
tightening of the rule language, converted to present-tense verbs, or 
translated to different modal verbs like ―will,‖ ―may,‖ or ―should.‖46 
C. Eliminating “Shall” from Rule 56 
With that background, we can return to the restyling of Rule 56.  
Knowing that it needed to somehow eliminate ―shall,‖ the Advisory 
Committee considered its options. 
The Advisory Committee rejected replacing ―shall‖ with ―must.‖  
―Must‖ seemed too rigid and inconsistent with Supreme Court language 
indicating that courts had discretion to decline to grant summary 
judgment in appropriate circumstances even when the motion was 
properly made and supported.
47
  Moreover, leading treatises and 
 
 41. See CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF OCT. 2003, supra note 37, at 4-8. 
 42. See Cooper, supra note 17, at 1777. 
 43. See Kimble Memorandum, supra note 21, at xviii.  See also CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF 
OCT. 2003, supra note 37, at 8; FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee‘s note (2007) (―[T]he word 
‗shall‘ can mean ‗must,‘ ‗may,‘ or something else, depending on context.  The potential for 
confusion is exacerbated by the fact that ‗shall‘ is no longer generally used in spoken or clearly 
written English.  The restyled rules replace ‗shall‘ with ‗must,‘ ‗may,‘ or ‗should,‘ depending on 
which one the context and established interpretation make correct in each rule.‖). 
 44. See Kimble, supra note 31, at 79. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 79-84. 
 47. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986); Kennedy v. Silas Mason 
Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1948). 
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considerable lower court case law also recognized that trial courts had 
discretion to deny summary-judgment motions for various reasons.
48
 
The Advisory Committee also rejected replacing ―shall‖ with 
―may.‖  ―May‖ seemed too weak.  As the Supreme Court famously 
expressed in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, summary judgment is not merely a 
discretionary power of the court or a disfavored remedy, but an integral 
part of the federal pretrial scheme.
49
  Indeed, language from Celotex can 
be read to say that summary judgment is mandatory when the required 
showing is made.
50
 
Ultimately, the Advisory Committee opted to translate ―shall‖ into 
―should.‖  As noted above, the Drafting Guidelines specifically allow for 
the use of ―should‖ when the intent is to denote a ―directory 
provision.‖51  The Advisory Committee concluded that using ―should‖ 
instead of ―must‖ or ―may‖ would signal that, while courts retain 
discretion to deny summary judgment when the required showing is 
made, the usual and expected course had been and would continue to be 
to grant such motions.
52
  To reinforce that point, the Advisory 
Committee included the following language in the accompanying 
Committee Note: ―‗Should‘ in amended Rule 56(c) recognizes that 
courts will seldom exercise the discretion to deny summary judgment 
when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.‖53 
The proposed Style Amendments were published for comment in 
February 2005.
54
  Taking up an invitation made by Reporter Ed 
Cooper,
55
 a blue-ribbon group of eleven law professors and ten 
practicing attorneys led by Professor Stephen Burbank and Greg Joseph 
undertook to review the entire restyling project.
56
  Written comments 
 
 48. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2728 (3d ed. 1998) 
(discussing lower court case law); 6 (Part 2) JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE‘S FEDERAL 
PRACTICE § 56.16[6] (2d ed. 1988) (same); 4 HAROLD A. KOOMAN, FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE § 
56.03 (1975). 
 49. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 
 50. Id. at 322. 
 51. See GARNER, supra note 32, § 4.2.A. 
 52. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, Apr. 15-16, 2004, at 39, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CRAC0404.pdf [hereinafter 
CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF APR. 2004]. 
 53. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee‘s note (2007). 
 54. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Style Revision of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Feb. 2005), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Prelim_draft_ 
proposed_pt1.pdf. 
 55. See Cooper, supra note 17 at 1785-86. 
 56. See Counseller, supra note 17, at 538-40. 
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were submitted by fifteen other groups or individuals.
57
  Only one of 
those comments directly addressed the change from ―shall‖ to ―should‖ 
in Rule 56.
58
 
The Advisory Committee made various changes to the style 
package of amendments in light of the comments and suggestions 
received and then submitted the Style Amendments for approval.  As 
submitted, restyled Rule 56 still translated ―shall‖ into ―should.‖  After 
completing their journey through the full rulemaking process,
59
 the 
restyled Civil Rules took effect on December 1, 2007.  On that day, 
―shall‖ became ―should.‖ 
III.  THE RESTORATION OF ―SHALL‖ 
Though the Advisory Committee did not know it at the time, the 
seeds of ―shall‘s‖ return were sowed two years before the restyled 
version of Rule 56 even took effect.  That is because the Advisory 
Committee began work on a substantive review of Rule 56 during a lull 
in the Style Project—the period when the Preliminary Proposed Draft of 
the Restyled Civil Rules was published and open for comment.
60
  By the 
time the restyled rules took effect in December, 2007, the work on 
revising the substance of Rule 56 had been in progress for nearly two 
years. 
In August 2008, less than a year after the restyled ―should‖ version 
of Rule 56 took effect, the Advisory Committee published proposed 
amendments to Rule 56.
61
  Although the published Rule 56 proposal 
retained the use of ―should,‖ it flagged the choice of ―should‖ for 
comment.  That set in motion a chain of events that ultimately led to the 
decision to restore ―shall.‖ 
 
 57. See 2005 Civil Rules Comments Chart http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0805Comments/2005CVCommentsChart.aspx. 
 58. See Comment Submitted by Professor Bradley Scott Shannon, 05-CV-009, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV%20Comments%202005/05-CV-009.pdf.  See 
also Shannon, supra note 11, at 88 n.15 (2008).  It should be noted, though, that the Burbank-Joseph group did 
raise other issues associated with the translation of words of authority.  See http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/CV%20Comments%202005/05-CV-022.pdf. 
 59. See James C. Duff, The Rulemaking Process:  A Summary for the Bench and Bar (October 2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/SummaryBenchBar.aspx. 
 60. See infra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 61. See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Rule 56 Project 
Rulemaking projects occasionally beget other projects.  This 
happens when work in one area brings to light issues that merit attention 
but that lie outside the scope of the existing project.  In this case, the 
restyling of Rule 56 led to a freestanding project to overhaul the content 
of Rule 56. 
The restyling of Rule 56 exposed a significant gulf between the text 
of the rule and everyday summary-judgment practice.  Some parts of the 
rule are no longer in sync with modern practice.  For example, the pre-
style version of Rule 56(c) provided that the motion ―shall be served at 
least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.‖62  But in reality, 
most summary-judgment motions are decided without a hearing,
63
 and 
the deadline for serving summary-judgment motions is typically set by 
the scheduling order rather than by reference to a hearing date.
64
  Given 
the limits of the Style Project, though, the Advisory Committee could do 
no more than restyle those outdated concepts.
65
  As another example, the 
pre-style version of Rule 56(c) provided that ―[t]he adverse party prior to 
the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits.‖66  Under Rule 5, 
however, service after the summons and complaint generally can be 
accomplished by mail, and service is complete upon mailing.
67
  That 
meant that someone technically could comply with Rule 56(c) by 
mailing opposing affidavits the day before a hearing even though the 
affidavits might not be received by opposing counsel until after the 
hearing had taken place.  Here too, the Advisory Committee flagged the 
problem but carried it forward in restyled text.
68
 
Another problem was that some well-established summary-
judgment practices find only indirect support in the text of Rule 56.  For 
example, the practice of parties seeking partial summary judgment—i.e., 
seeking summary judgment on fewer than all claims in the case—is 
 
 62. See STEVEN S. GENSLER, 2007 STYLE PROJECT COMPARISON CHARTS 187 (2008). 
 63. See 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:  RULES AND 
COMMENTARY 899 (2010); MOORE ET AL., supra note 1, at § 56.15[1]; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
43(c) (―When a motion relies on facts outside the record, the court may hear the matter on affidavits 
or may hear it wholly or partly on oral testimony or on depositions.‖). 
 64. See GENSLER, supra note 63, at 888; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(A) (scheduling 
order must set a deadline for filing motions). 
 65. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (―The motion must be served at least 10 days before the day set 
for the hearing.‖). 
 66. See GENSLER, supra note 62, at 187. 
 67. See FED. R. CIV. P. 5(b)(2)(C). 
 68. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (―An opposing party may serve opposing affidavits before the 
hearing day.‖). 
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well-established in both the case law and in the secondary sources.
69
  But 
Rule 56 does not contain the phrase ―partial summary judgment.‖70  
Nonetheless, judges and lawyers alike recognized the propriety of the 
practice, and with good reason.  Both Rule 56(a) and Rule 56(b) allow a 
party to move for summary judgment ―on all or part of a claim.‖  And 
Rule 54(b) implicitly recognizes the concept of partial summary 
judgments by creating a mechanism for a judge to enter a final judgment 
on a ruling that disposes of fewer than all claims.
71
  To many, though, it 
seemed odd that such an important and well-established aspect of 
summary-judgment practice was not addressed in the rule text more 
directly. 
Finally, many of the crucial practical aspects of summary 
judgment—particularly motion and briefing practices—were not covered 
in the national rule, leading to a dizzying array of local practices 
sometimes codified in local rules and sometimes left to the individual 
judge‘s preferences.72  Here too, the gap in the rule simply was not a 
subject that could be addressed in the Style Project.  The Advisory 
Committee flagged the apparent need for content reform but left it for 
another project and another day.
73
 
That day came quickly.  The Advisory Committee took up the 
matter of a possible Rule 56 project at its October 2005 meeting.
74
  
There was strong support for undertaking a project that would address 
the many ways in which the rule text failed to connect with everyday 
summary-judgment practice.  In the words of one of the attorney 
members of the Advisory Committee, ―the rule [was] a wreck.‖75  Others 
feared that the variation in local summary-judgment practices created 
traps for the unwary.
76
  A consensus emerged that the Advisory 
 
 69. See GENSLER, supra note 63, at 909-11; MOORE ET AL. supra note 1, at § 56.40. 
 70. The phrase ―partial summary judgment‖ does appear in the 1946 Advisory Committee 
note discussing the addition of the text specifically allowing for ―interlocutory summary judgment‖ 
on the matter of liability.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 56(d) & advisory committee‘s note (1946). 
 71. See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b). 
 72. See GENSLER, supra note 63, at 897; MOORE ET AL. supra note 1, at § 56.10[5]. 
 73. See CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF APR. 2004, supra note 52, at 38-39. 
 74. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, Oct. 27-28, 2005, at 24-29, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV11-2005-min.pdf [hereinafter 
CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF OCT. 2005].  To put the timing in perspective, the proposed style 
amendments were still in the comment period when the Advisory Committee returned to Rule 56 to 
follow up on the issues flagged during the restyling of Rule 56.  The Advisory Committee published 
the restyled Civil Rules for comment in February 2005, but due to the magnitude of the project 
allowed a ten-month period for comment through December 15, 2005.  See Introduction to 
Preliminary Draft of Restyled Civil Rules, supra note 20, at viii. 
 75. See CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF OCT. 2005, supra note 74, at 27. 
 76. See id. at 28. 
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Committee should explore ways to reconnect the text of Rule 56 with 
summary-judgment practice and to make summary-judgment practice 
more predictable and more uniform. 
In contrast, there was little support for undertaking any effort to 
change—or even restate—the standard for summary judgment.77  I think 
this reflected, at least in part, a prevailing sense among the committee 
members that the existing summary-judgment standard gets it more or 
less right.  It also reflected the Advisory Committee‘s awareness of what 
happened the last time it undertook a comprehensive Rule 56 project.  
After the Supreme Court‘s 1986 trilogy of summary judgment cases,78 
the Advisory Committee undertook a project to comprehensively revise 
Rule 56.  Among other things, the revisions would have restated the 
summary-judgment standard as it ―ha[d] been developed through case 
law.‖79  The Judicial Conference ended up rejecting the proposed 
changes in 1992.
80
  Legend has it that the proposal came under attack 
both from those who liked the trilogy and those who did not.
81
  Those 
who liked the trilogy saw no need to make any changes.  Those who 
disliked the trilogy resisted any effort to enshrine its meaning.  That 
failed effort illustrated how difficult it would be to re-articulate the 
summary-judgment standard in a way that would achieve anything like a 
consensus of approval. 
The lessons learned from 1992 played no small part in the Advisory 
Committee‘s decision not to touch the articulation of the underlying 
summary-judgment standards in the Rule 56 Project.  It seemed likely 
that any changes to the standard would draw fire from somewhere.  
Given that there did not appear to be any pressing need to change the 
existing phrasing of the standard, it seemed prudent to limit the scope of 
the project to the more mechanical proposals and not risk needlessly 
creating additional grounds for potential opposition. 
 
 77. See CIVIL RULES REPORT AS SUPPLEMENTED JUNE 2008, supra note 8, at 23 (emphasizing 
―the firm purpose to revise Rule 56 only with respect to the procedures for presenting and deciding 
a summary-judgment motion‖). 
 78. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett; 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 
U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
 79. See REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE 
ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, May 1, 1992, at 124, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV5-1992.pdf. 
 80. See COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, MINUTES, Dec. 17-19, 1992, at 
2, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/ST12-1992-min.pdf. 
 81. See CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF OCT. 2005, supra note 74, at 26. 
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A subcommittee was formed and District Judge Michael Baylson 
(E.D. Pa.) was tabbed to serve as Chair.  After a year of study,
82
 the 
subcommittee reported back to the full Advisory Committee in 
September 2006.
83
  Consistent with the tentative views expressed in 
October 2005, the subcommittee submitted a preliminary draft of a 
proposed amended Rule 56, along with an accompanying memorandum 
that made three principal recommendations.  First, the subcommittee 
proposed that Rule 56 should set forth nationally-uniform procedures for 
making and briefing summary-judgment motions.
84
  These procedures 
would include a requirement that the moving party file a detailed 
statement of facts and that the responding party meet that statement head 
on.  Second, the subcommittee proposed that Rule 56 should explicitly 
address various common practices like motions for partial summary 
judgment.
85
  Third, the subcommittee‘s proposal left the operative 
summary-judgment standard untouched, instead leaving that topic to the 
ongoing evolution of summary-judgment practice under Celotex and 
related cases.
86
  The Advisory Committee agreed with those 
recommendations and, after discussing the various details of the 
proposal, remitted it back to the subcommittee for further work.
87
 
After two years of further study and deliberation at both the 
subcommittee level and before the full committee,
88
 including two mini-
conferences held in 2007 to elicit the views of practicing lawyers and 
 
 82. The Advisory Committee received an interim report at its May 2006 meeting.  The focus 
of the interim report was on how local rules were addressing the various practice issues under 
consideration.  See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, AGENDA BOOK, May 22-23, 2006, at 
396, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2006-
05.pdf.  In that regard, the Advisory Committee benefited greatly from the research assistance of 
Administrative Office staff attorneys James Ishida and Jeffrey Barr.  See id. at 397-408.  See also 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, Apr. 19-20, 2007, at 3, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-2007-min.pdf. 
 83. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, Sept. 7-8, 2006, at 24-30, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV09-2006-min.pdf [hereinafter 
CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF SEPT. 2006]. 
 84. See Memorandum from the Rule 56 Subcommittee to the Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, 
Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Aug. 21, 2006, at 1, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2006-09.pdf (Sept. 2006 Agenda Book at 303). 
 85. Id. at 2. 
 86. Id. at 1. 
 87. CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF SEPT. 2006, supra note 83, at 24-30. 
 88. The Advisory Committee discussed the ongoing work on the Rule 56 project at its April 2007 
meeting, at its November 2007 meeting, and again at its April 2008 meeting.  Detailed information on those 
discussions can be found in the official Minutes of those meetings, which are available on-line at the Federal 
Rulemaking website hosted by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.  See http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Minutes.aspx. 
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academics,
89
 the Advisory Committee presented a Rule 56 proposal to 
the Standing Committee seeking permission to publish it for public 
comment.
90
  Permission was granted and the Rule 56 proposal was 
published in August 2008.
91
 
B. The Push for “Must” 
In the published materials, the Advisory Committee specifically 
invited comments on several aspects of the proposal.
 92
  One of those 
topics was whether Rule 56 should continue to use the term ―should.‖93  
There were several reasons for doing so.  First, whereas the initial switch 
from ―shall‖ to ―should‖ elicited very little comment just two years 
earlier,
94
 things were different this time around.  People were definitely 
taking notice of the issue and were arguing that the style translation had 
been a mistake.
95
  Second, those same questions were being raised inside 
the rulemaking process.
96
  Finally, when the proposal was presented to 
the Standing Committee to receive permission to publish, several 
members of the Standing Committee presented their own beliefs that 
summary judgment was and should remain a mandatory procedure.
97
  
After a lengthy discussion, permission to publish was granted on the 
 
 89. See RULE 56 MINICONFERENCE NOTES, Nov. 7, 2007, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2006-09.pdf 
(Apr. 2008 Agenda Book at 60); NOTES:  RULE 56 MINICONFERENCE, Jan. 28, 2007, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Civil/CV2006-09.pdf 
(Apr. 2007 Agenda Book at 413). 
 90. See CIVIL RULES REPORT AS SUPPLEMENTED JUNE 2008, supra note 8. 
 91. See supra note 8; Memorandum to Bench, Bar, and Public, Aug. 8, 2008, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/2008-08-
Memo_to_Bench_Bar_8_8_08.pdf. 
 92. For example, the Advisory Committee specifically invited comment on the so-called 
point-counterpoint briefing procedure included in the published proposal.  See CIVIL RULES REPORT 
AS SUPPLEMENTED, supra note 8, at 25. 
 93. See id. at 23-25.  The summary brochure version contained a similar specific invitation for 
comment on the use of ―should‖ in Rule 56.  See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, A SUMMARY FOR BENCH AND BAR (Aug. 2008), http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/Brochure.pdf. 
 94. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
 95. See Mark R. Kravitz, To Revise, or Not to Revise:  That Is the Question, 87 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 213, 221 (2010) (―When ‗should‘ was carried forward in the proposed Rule 56 revisions, 
defense counsel awoke and protested vigorously, arguing that the Committee should change 
‗should‘ to ‗must.‘‖). 
 96. As the invitation for comment explained, ―[s]ome who have participated in developing the 
present proposal have argued that ‗should‘ is the wrong word, and should be replaced by ‗must.‘‖  
See CIVIL RULES REPORT AS SUPPLEMENTED, supra note 8, at 23. 
 97. See STANDING COMMITTEE MINUTES OF JUNE 2008, supra note 10, at 24-29. 
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condition that the proposed amendment be published in a form that 
highlighted ―should‖ and ―must‖ as alternatives.98  The invitation to 
comment fulfilled that condition. 
The invitation for comment on the must-should issue was heard and 
accepted.  Published proposals often elicit few comments.  The Advisory 
Committee frequently cancels scheduled hearings due to a lack of 
requests to testify.  But other published proposals elicit comments in 
droves and result in well-attended hearings.  The Rule 56 proposal fell 
squarely in the latter camp.
99
  By my count, the Advisory Committee 
received 48 written comments that specifically addressed the must-
should issue.
100
  At hearings held in Washington, San Antonio, and San 
Francisco, 25 witnesses (by my count) dedicated all or part of their 
testimony to addressing the must-should issue.
101
 
There appears to have been an organized effort by the defense bar 
to press for replacing ―should‖ with ―must.‖102  I suspect that the 
proponents of ―must‖ were marshaling the troops in an effort to 
capitalize on what must have seemed like a once-in-a-generation 
opportunity to enshrine their preference for a mandatory approach to 
summary judgment into the rule text. 
The comments and testimony offered in support of ―must‖ covered 
a wide range of grounds.  Many simply argued that the style translation 
of ―shall‖ to ―should‖ was an error that needed to be corrected.103  One 
 
 98. Id. at 29. 
 99. Had the Rule 56 proposal been by itself, I am certain it still would have provoked a 
similar level of interest.  It should be noted, though, that the Advisory Committee was 
simultaneously seeking comment on a proposal to amend the expert discovery provisions of Rule 
26.  See CIVIL RULES REPORT AS SUPPLEMENTED JUNE 2008, supra note 8.  The Rule 26 proposed 
amendments no doubt contributed to the public‘s interest in examining and commenting on the full 
package of proposed amendments. 
 100. The full set of comments is available at the following link:  http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0808Comments/2008
CVCommentsChart.aspx. 
 101. Transcripts of the hearings are available at the following link:  http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0808Comments.aspx. 
 102. See Cary E. Hiltgen, DRI’s Voice Is Being Heard, FOR THE DEFENSE, June 2010, at 1 
(describing organized participation at hearings to argue against ―should‖). 
 103. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 17, 2008, at 139 
(statement of Bruce R. Parker); Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Jan. 14, 
2009, at 107-09 (statement of G. Edward Pickle); Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, Feb. 2, 2009, at 204 (statement of Mr. Lucey); id. at 235-37 (statement of Jeffrey 
Greenbaum); Comment Submitted by Claudia D. McCarron, 08-CV-44; Comment Submitted by 
Latha Raghavan, 08-CV-051; Comment Submitted by Lawyers for Civil Justice and the U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 08-CV-61; Comment Submitted by G. Edward Pickle, 08-CV-
110; Comment Submitted by Keith B. O‘Connell, 08-CV-116.  Transcripts of the hearings and the 
17
Gensler: Must, Should, Shall
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
7-GENSLER_WESTERN 11/9/2010  1:13 PM 
1156 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:1139 
of the more persistent themes was that summary judgment was 
inherently nondiscretionary because the text of Rule 56 requires a 
successful moving party to show that it is ―entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.‖104  Other arguments were less technical.  Some argued 
that unequivocally mandatory language was needed to combat what 
those persons characterized as a persistent reluctance of federal judges to 
grant the relief afforded under Rule 56.
105
  A few appealed to the 
Advisory Committee‘s commitment to promoting the rule of law, 
worrying about the loss of respect for the judicial system if federal 
courts were to signal that they do not feel obligated to respect legal 
entitlements.
106
 
The ―pro-must‖ comments were then met by voices from 
(generally) the plaintiff‘s bar who urged the retention of discretion.  In 
the aggregate, they read, ironically enough, like a point-counterpoint-
style response to the arguments being urged for ―must.‖  These 
comments often supported the style translation to ―should‖ as accurately 
capturing the sense of the pre-2007 case law.
107
  Some urged that 
 
submitted comments may be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0808Comments.aspx. 
 104. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 17, 2008, at 52-53 
(statement of Ed Brunet); id. at 93 (statement of Tom Gottschalk); id. at 155 (statement of Alfred 
Cortese); Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Feb. 2, 2009, at 69 (statement of 
Michael Nelson); id. at 94 (statement of Mr. Glaesner); Comment Submitted by American College 
of Trial Lawyers, Federal Civil Rules Committee, 08-CV-60; Comment Submitted by Michael R. 
Nelson, 08-CV-127; Comment Submitted by Marc E. Williams, 08-CV-135; Comment Submitted 
by the U.S. Dept. of Justice, 08-CV-180; Comment Submitted by Lawyers for Civil Justice and U.S. 
Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 08-CV-181.  Transcripts of the hearings and the submitted 
comments may be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ 
ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0808Comments.aspx. 
 105. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 17, 2008, at 109 
(statement of Theodore Van Itallie); Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Jan. 
14, 2009, at 35 (statement of Michele Smith); id. at 141 (statement of Stephen Pate); Hearing 
Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Feb. 2, 2009, at 81-82 (statement of Kevin J. 
Dunne); Comment Submitted by Robert B. Anderson, 08-CV-011; Comment Submitted by Lawyers 
for Civil Justice, 08-CV-061; Comment Submitted by Wayne B. Mason, 08-CV-124.  Transcripts of 
the hearings and the submitted comments may be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0808Comments.aspx. 
 106. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 17, 2008, at 10 
(statement of Claudia McCarron); id. at 92-93 (statement of Thomas Gottschalk); Hearing Before 
the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Jan. 14, 2009, at 132-33 (statement of Keith B. O‘Connell); 
Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Feb. 2, 2009 (statement of Mr. Downs); 
Comment Submitted by Lawyers for Civil Justice and U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 08-
CV-181.  Transcripts of the hearings and the submitted comments may be found at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Prop
osed0808Comments.aspx. 
 107. See, e.g., Comment Submitted by Gregory K. Arenson, 08-CV-131; Comment Submitted 
by the Federal Magistrate Judges Association, 08-CV-161.  Both Comments may be found at 
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discretion was essential as a means of dealing with cases where there 
was reason to think that the trial evidence might differ materially from 
the pretrial record, or where some other reason existed to believe that the 
sufficiency of the evidence would be better tested with live evidence at 
trial than on a paper record.
108
  Some noted the possibility that, in certain 
cases, it might be easier to proceed to trial if only as a means of 
facilitating appeal.
109
  Some argued that ―should‖ was appropriate as a 
means of tempering the behavior of judges who, according to this view, 
were too quick and too eager to grant summary judgment.
110
  Finally, 
some argued that the overuse and abuse of summary judgment was itself 
threatening respect for the courts and the rule of law.
111
 
C. “Shall Be Granted” Returns as a “Sacred Phrase” 
The Advisory Committee met immediately after the final hearing 
on the proposed changes to Rule 56 in San Francisco.  Concluding that 
there was no consensus on either the need for or the merit of a 
nationally-uniform point-counterpoint process, the Advisory Committee 
dropped that part of the proposal.
112
  That left the issue of must-should, 
 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Prop
osed0808Comments/2008CVCommentsChart.aspx. 
 108. See, e.g., Comment Submitted by Joseph D. Garrison, 08-CV-016; Comment Submitted 
by the Honorable David F. Hamilton, 08-CV-142; Comment Submitted by Professor Suja A. 
Thomas, 08-CV-158; Comment Submitted by Professor Eric Schnapper, 08-CV-183.  All 
Comments may be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ 
ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0808Comments/2008CVCommentsChart.aspx.  See 
generally REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON 
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, May 8, 2009, at 21, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/CV05-2009.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL RULES REPORT OF MAY 2009]. 
 109. See, e.g., Comment Submitted by Alan B. Morrison, 08-CV-39, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Prop
osed0808Comments/2008CVCommentsChart.aspx. 
 110. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Jan. 14, 2009 (statement 
of Tom Crane).  A related comment made by many plaintiff-oriented writers and witnesses was that 
judges were abusing summary judgment by overreaching in their determinations that the plaintiff 
lacked proof sufficient to sustain a favorable jury finding on an essential element of the claim.  See, 
e.g., Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 17, 2008, at 23 (statement of 
Richard Seymour); id. at 67 (statement of Professor Elizabeth Schneider).  These comments, 
however, typically came in the context of objecting to the point-counterpoint mechanism rather than 
the choice between ―must‖ and ―should.‖  Transcripts of the hearings and the submitted comments 
may be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/ 
Comments/Proposed0808Comments.aspx. 
 111. See, e.g., Comment Submitted by Richard L. Seymour, 08-CV-66, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Prop
osed0808Comments/2008CVCommentsChart.aspx. 
 112. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, Feb. 2-3, 2009, at 2-3, 
[hereinafter CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF FEB. 2009].  The decision to abandon the point-
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and neither option had yet gained any consensus among the committee 
members.
113
  A third option broke the logjam. 
Recall that ―shall‖ had been restyled to ―should‖ because the 
overarching style conventions held that shall was an ambiguous word to 
be excised from the rules.
114
  As a function of translation, ―should‖ 
appeared then to be a proper substitute.  The problem, as future events 
made clear, was that ―shall‖ turned out to be more than just a word in 
Rule 56.  As embedded in the larger phrase ―shall be rendered,‖ it had 
acquired a history of usage and meaning over the course of 71 years of 
practice and case law. 
That conclusion triggered a countervailing style convention—the 
principle that the restyled rules should retain words and phrases that had, 
through usage and case law, taken on a special meaning that could not 
safely be translated into properly-styled new text.
115
  In other words, 
when the restyling project encountered so-called ―sacred phrases,‖ it 
carried them forward undisturbed even if they did not perfectly conform 
to the general style conventions.
116
 
The sacred phrase principle had been applied to Rule 56 before.  
When Rule 56 was restyled, the Advisory Committee did not attempt to 
restate the summary-judgment standard.  Most notably, restyled Rule 
56(c) preserved the phrase ―there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact‖ on the basis that it was a sacred phrase.117 
At the February meeting in San Francisco, the Advisory Committee 
invoked the ―sacred phrase‖ principle as grounds for reinstating ―shall‖ 
instead of choosing between ―must‖ or ―should‖ or adopting some other 
phrasing (e.g., ―must unless . . . .‖).118  In effect, the Advisory 
Committee recognized, in retrospect, that the phrase ―shall be rendered‖ 
 
counterpoint mechanism was reaffirmed at the Advisory Committee‘s April 2009 meeting.  See 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RULES, MINUTES, Apr. 20-21, 2009, at 7, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV04-2009-min.pdf [hereinafter 
CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF APR. 2009]. 
 113. The Advisory Committee also invited comment on suggestions that would have avoided 
the must-should issue by rephrasing the operative standard in a way that did not require the choice 
of a modal verb.  See CIVIL RULES REPORT AS SUPPLEMENTED JUNE 2009, supra note 8, at 24-25.  
The Advisory Committee ultimately opted not to take that approach.  It was not clear that any 
substitute phrasing would perfectly convey the existing summary judgment standard, and even if 
one were found it risked skewing the standard when construed and applied by later generations of 
practitioners and judges.  See id.; CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF FEB. 2009, supra note 112, at 4. 
 114. See supra notes 24-46 and accompanying text. 
 115. See Kimble Memorandum, supra note 21, at xix-xx. 
 116. See id.; Cooper, supra note 17, at 1771-72. 
 117. See Kimble Memorandum, supra note 21, at xx. 
 118. See CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF FEB. 2009, supra note 112, at 3-6. 
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was a sacred phrase that never should have been altered.  When the 
Advisory Committee met again in April 2009 in Chicago, it reconfirmed 
by unanimous vote the recommendation to restore ―shall.‖119 
Now it was time to convince the Standing Committee to make an 
exception to the ban on ―shall.‖  In its Report to the Standing 
Committee, the Advisory Committee couched the decision to revert to 
―shall‖ as correcting an error committed during the Style Project. 
Restoring ‗shall‘ is consistent with two strategies often followed 
during the Style Project.  The objection to ‗shall‘ is that it is inherently 
ambiguous.  But time and again ambiguous expressions were 
deliberately carried forward in the Style Project precisely because 
substitution of a clear statement threatened to work a change in 
substantive meaning.  And time and again the Style Project accepted 
‗sacred phrases,‘ no matter how antique they might seem.  The flood of 
comments, and the case law they invoke, demonstrates that ‗shall‘ had 
become too sacred to be sacrificed.
120
 
Of course, the substantive Rule 56 project was not inherently 
limited to style and therefore could have included any sort of content 
change, even one that would alter a so-called sacred phrase.  But, as 
discussed above, the Advisory Committee had decided early on not to 
make any changes in the Rule 56 project that would alter the standard 
for summary judgment.
121
  The Advisory Committee determined that, 
even if the question of discretion was not itself a part of the standard, it 
was so closely bound up with it as to require preservation of the status 
quo.
122
  Viewed that way, the foundational principles of both the Style 
Project and the Rule 56 project converged and compelled the selection 
of language that would ensure that the level of discretion available to 
judges had not been altered by either.  Restoring ―shall‖ presented the 
clearest path to accomplish that goal.
123
 
 
 119. See CIVIL ADVISORY MINUTES OF APR. 2009, supra note 112, at 3. 
 120. CIVIL RULES REPORT OF MAY 2009, supra note 108, at 21. 
 121. See supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text. 
 122. See CIVIL RULES REPORT OF MAY 2009, supra note 108, at 20. 
 123. Professor Kimble has called the reintroduction of ―shall‖ into Rule 56 ―an incredible 
postscript.‖  Kimble, supra note 31, at 84.  Kimble criticizes the choice to reintroduce a term that is 
now generally accepted as being inherently ambiguous.  Id. at 85.  Implicit in Kimble‘s criticism is 
his belief that the Advisory Committee should have worked harder to find an alternate for ―shall.‖  
The problem, though, was that the case law could be read to give conflicting accounts of what ―shall 
be rendered‖ meant in Rule 56.  Here is where the Advisory Committee‘s choice to not touch the 
substantive Rule 56 standard intersects.  If one views the issue of discretion as being a part of the 
standard, and the case law under ―shall‖ gives conflicting accounts of whether the judge has 
discretion, then the only way to preserve the standard is to carry forward the existing text, including 
―shall.‖  Any attempt to translate ―shall‖ would have risked altering the standard. 
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The die is now cast for the return of ―shall.‖  The Standing 
Committee approved the Rule 56 proposal with the reversion to ―shall,‖ 
as did the Judicial Conference.
124
  On April 28, the Supreme Court 
transmitted the proposed Rule 56 amendments to Congress.
125
  By 
Supreme Court order, the proposed amendments have been adopted and 
will take effect on December 1, 2010 absent contrary action by 
Congress.
126
  Thus, unless Congress derails the proposed amendments, 
Rule 56 will, on that date, once again provide that summary judgment 
―shall be rendered‖ if the moving party shows that there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
IV.  DISCRETION IN THE SECOND ―SHALL‖ AGE 
So if all goes as expected, ―shall‖ will be restored to Rule 56 on 
December 1, 2010.  What, exactly, will that mean?  The answer is both 
simple and complex. 
The simple answer is that things will stand exactly as they did on 
November 30, 2007, the day before the restyled version of Rule 56 took 
effect.  The clear and clearly-stated purpose of restoring ―shall‖ was to 
be sure that things were put back to where they were on the day before 
the style amendments took effect.  When the Advisory Committee 
restyled Rule 56, it believed that the word ―should‖—in conjunction 
with the Committee Note explaining that the discretion to deny should 
be seldom exercised—accurately captured the way that ―shall‖ had been 
interpreted and applied by the Supreme Court and the lower courts.
127
  
The change was intended to be stylistic only.  It was meant only to 
communicate what the Advisory Committee believed to be the status 
quo. 
 
  That conclusion, of course, is contingent on the premise that the choice between ―must,‖ 
―shall,‖ ―should,‖ or some other modal verb is intertwined with the standard for summary judgment.  
I challenge that premise in the forthcoming article addressing the larger picture of discretion to deny 
summary judgment.  See supra note 16. 
 124. See Transmittal Letter of Proposed Amendments to the Supreme Court, http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
rules/Supreme%20Court%202009/Duff-Main-Transmittal-Memo.pdf; Summary of the Report of the 
Judicial Conference on Rules of Practice and Procedure, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/ 
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/Combined_ST_Report_Sept_2009.pdf. 
 125. See Letters Submitting Proposed Amendments to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives and to the President of the Senate, http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/ 
courtorders/frcv10.pdf. 
 126. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (2006). 
 127. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text. 
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The restoration of ―shall‖ is, in effect, the Advisory Committee‘s 
second attempt at achieving the status quo.  During the Rule 56 project, 
the Advisory Committee started to hear concerns that ―should‖ was a 
mistranslation of ―shall.‖  As discussed earlier, many contended that 
―should‖ was a blatant mistranslation on the basis that ―shall‖ had never 
conferred any discretion at all.
128
  A more moderate criticism of 
―should‖ was that, even if courts had some measure of discretion under 
―shall,‖ the term ―should‖ overstated whatever discretion did exist.  In 
that vein, the Advisory Committee was told that some lawyers and 
academic commentators already were taking the position that the 
introduction of ―should‖ to Rule 56 increased the level of discretion 
available, that some lawyers were changing their bargaining positions on 
that basis, and that it would be just a matter of time before courts started 
to accept the argument.
129
  A longer-term concern was that, even if 
judges today properly gauged the amount of discretion available, over 
time ―should‖ would become corrupted as future generations of lawyers 
and courts read into it more discretion than ever existed under ―shall.‖130 
In the end, the question boiled down to this: given that the 
Advisory Committee had all along been trying to find the best way to 
express the state of the law as it existed under the pre-style version of 
Rule 56, what words would best capture the meaning of ―shall be 
rendered‖?  The Advisory Committee determined that the only sure-fire 
way to capture that meaning was with those exact words.  Hence, ―shall 
be rendered‖ was restored.  As the Committee Note to the 2010 version 
of the rule explains, ―[e]liminating ‗shall‘ created an unacceptable risk 
of changing the summary-judgment standard.  Restoring ‗shall‘ avoids 
the unintended consequences of any other word.‖131 
At risk of appearing to state the obvious, I think it is important to 
emphasize that the restoration of ―shall‖ does no more than return us to 
whatever level of discretion existed prior to the restyling of Rule 56.  By 
 
 128. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text. 
 129. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 17, 2008, at 54 
(statement of Ed Brunet); Hearing Before the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Nov. 17, 2008, at 
12 (statement of Ms. McCarron) (stating that a popular reference book on the Civil Rules had taken 
the position that ―should‖ gave trial judges additional discretion); Comment Submitted by Lawyers 
for Civil Justice and the U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform, 08-CV-61.  Transcripts of the 
hearings and the submitted comments may be found at http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0808Comments.aspx. 
 130. See, e.g., Comment Submitted by Lawyers for Civil Justice and the U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform, 08-CV-61, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/ 
FederalRulemaking/ResearchingRules/Comments/Proposed0808Comments.aspx. 
 131. FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee‘s notes to the proposed 2010 rules. 
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that I mean to stress that the upcoming switch from ―should‖ back to 
―shall‖ is not meant to decrease the level of discretion available under 
Rule 56. 
Recall that there was an intense effort to get the Advisory 
Committee to replace ―should‖ with ―must.‖132  While that effort failed, 
it did lead to a partial victory of sorts with the restoration of ―shall.‖  I 
expect that the proponents of ―must‖ will now seek to convert it to a full 
victory by asking the courts to interpret ―shall‖ as ―must‖ in the case 
law.  That argument can take two forms, one legitimate and the other 
not. 
It will be legitimate for the proponents of a mandatory view of 
summary judgment to argue that Rule 56 never conferred discretion.  As 
I develop in the follow-up to this article, I disagree with that view.
133
  
But the question is not wholly without debate,
134
 and the argument is at 
least consistent with the purpose of restoring the status quo by restoring 
―shall.‖  That is to say, if courts conclude that ―shall‖ always meant 
―must‖—and that ―shall‖ never included any measure of discretion— 
then a return to the pre-style status quo would properly yield a 
mandatory, nondiscretionary approach. 
What will be illegitimate is if the proponents of a mandatory view 
of summary judgment argue that the switch from ―should‖ to ―shall‖ 
itself stripped courts of discretion.  The history of the style project and 
the Committee Notes to the 2007 and 2010 amendments make it 
abundantly clear that the reason for restoring ―shall‖ was to ensure that 
the level of discretion available under Rule 56 is restored to whatever it 
was before December 1, 2007.
135
  Just as the switch from ―shall‖ to 
―should‖ did not increase that level of discretion, the switch back to 
―shall‖ does not decrease it. 
This point is an important one, and by making it now I hope to 
preempt lawyers from arguing that the upcoming 2010 switch from 
―should‖ to ―shall‖ has any effect on whether courts have discretion 
under Rule 56.  While I cannot stop lawyers from making that argument, 
I can say this.  Given the history and the explanations provided in the 
2007 and 2010 Committee Notes setting forth the reasons for restoring 
―shall,‖ any lawyer who argues that the upcoming 2010 switch from 
 
 132. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra note 16. 
 134. See generally Jack H. Friedenthal & Joshua E. Gardner, Judicial Discretion to Deny 
Summary Judgment in the Era of Managerial Judging, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (2002). 
 135. See supra notes 112-23 and accompanying text. 
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―should‖ to ―shall‖ took away discretion does so at his or her peril of 
Rule 11 sanctions. 
Now we come to the complex part of the answer.  Re-linking the 
question of discretion to deny to pre-style standards would provide a 
clear answer if the pre-style standards themselves were clear and 
unequivocal.  They are not.  That fact, of course, was the reason why the 
Advisory Committee ultimately decided that it could not safely translate 
―shall‖ without incurring an unacceptable risk of changing the 
substantive standards.
136
  Thus, the complex answer is that we will not 
know whether the ―shall‖ version of Rule 56 confers any discretion to 
deny, or how much, or in what circumstances, until the courts provide 
some more definitive answers.  In particular, we must await a clear 
ruling from the Supreme Court in which it explains or reconciles what 
appear to be conflicting dicta about whether Rule 56 creates a procedural 
entitlement to judgment without trial.
137
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
When the Advisory Committee restyled Rule 56 in 2007, its goal 
was ―clarity without change.‖138  The Advisory Committee thought that 
translating ―shall be granted‖ to ―should be granted‖ accomplished that 
goal.  Later events and further analysis persuaded the Advisory 
Committee that the switch from ―shall‖ to ―should‖ presented a real risk 
of substantive change, even taking into account language in the 
Committee Note to the 2007 amendment emphasizing that no 
substantive change was intended.
139
  Receiving a special dispensation to 
use the otherwise off-limits term ―shall,‖ the Advisory Committee 
determined that the best course—the only safe course—was to restore 
―shall‖ to eliminate the risk that courts now or in the future would 
conclude that the switch from ―shall‖ to ―should‖ signaled substantive 
change. 
Was the risk of change as real or substantial as some said?  I think 
the jury was still out—so to speak—on that point.  What may have been 
more relevant is the special role that summary judgment plays in the 
federal civil pretrial scheme.  Rule 56 is one of the cornerstones of 
federal civil pretrial practice.
140
  As originally designed, summary 
 
 136. See supra notes 112-31 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. 
 138. See Cooper, supra note 17. 
 139. See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee‘s note (2007). 
 140. BRUNET & REDISH, supra note 14, § 1:1; GENSLER, supra note 63, at 884. 
25
Gensler: Must, Should, Shall
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
7-GENSLER_WESTERN 11/9/2010  1:13 PM 
1164 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:1139 
judgment was intended to serve as a check on liberal pleading.
141
  And 
as the Supreme Court famously stated, ―[s]ummary judgment procedure 
is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as 
an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‗to 
secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every 
action.‘‖142  In other words, even the smallest risk of unintended change 
may have been too much for a rule that is so central to the civil pretrial 
process. 
And so we return to ―shall.‖  In doing so, all of the arguments about 
whether the 2007 style change to ―should‖ altered the question of 
whether trial courts have discretion to deny properly-supported 
summary-judgment motions will become moot.  The pre-style meaning 
of Rule 56 is preserved, and, going forward, the question of whether 
courts have any discretion to deny summary judgment becomes 
unquestionably linked with pre-style meaning and practice. 
If the three-year ―should‖ era has any lasting legacy, it will be that 
it put the question of discretion to deny under the brightest of spotlights, 
placing center-stage a question that largely had stood unnoticed off to 
the side.  Will the question remain in the spotlight?  Will the proponents 
of ―must‖ continue the battle in the courts, arguing that ―shall‖ always 
meant ―must‖?  Will the Supreme Court weigh in?  Or will the 
restoration of ―shall‖ shuffle the question of discretion to deny into the 
background once again?  We shall see. 
 
 141. See 10A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 48, § 2712; Charles E. Clark, The Summary 
Judgment, 36 MINN. L. REV. 567, 578 (1952) (―The very freedom permitted by the simplified 
pleadings of the modern practice is subject to abuse unless it is checked by the devices looking to 
the summary disclosure of the merits if the case is to continue to trial.  Those are discovery, 
summary judgment, and pre-trial – all necessary correlatives of each other and of a system which 
may permit the concealment of the weakness of a case in the generalized pleadings of the present 
day.‖).  See also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (―This simplified notice 
pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define 
disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.‖). 
 142. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). 
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